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Abstract
We describe an approach for compiling preferences into
logic programs under the answer set semantics. An or-
dered logic program is an extended logic program in
which rules are named by unique terms, and in which
preferences among rules are given by a set of atoms
of the form s ≺ t where s and t are names. An or-
dered logic program is transformed into a second, reg-
ular, extended logic program wherein the preferences
are respected, in that the answer sets obtained in the
transformed theory correspond with the preferred an-
swer sets of the original theory. Our approach allows
both the specification of static orderings (as found in
most previous work), in which preferences are exter-
nal to a logic program, as well as orderings on sets of
rules. In large part then, we are interested in describ-
ing a general methodology for uniformly incorporating
preference information in a logic program. Since the
result of our translation is an extended logic program,
we can make use of existing implementations, such as
dlv and smodels. To this end, we have developed a
compiler, available on the web, as a front-end for these
programming systems.
Introduction
In commonsense reasoning one frequently prefers one
outcome over another, or the application of one rule
over another, or the drawing of one default conclusion
over another. For example, in buying a car one may
have various desiderata in mind (inexpensive, safe, fast,
etc.) where these preferences come in varying degrees
of importance. In legal reasoning, laws may apply by
default but the laws themselves may conflict. So munic-
ipal laws will have a lower priority than state laws, and
newer laws will take priority over old. Further, if these
preferences conflict, there will need to be higher-order
preferences to decide the conflict.
In this paper we explore the problem of preference
orderings within the framework of extended logic pro-
grams under the answer set semantics (Gelfond & Lif-
schitz 1991). The general methodology was first pro-
posed in (Delgrande & Schaub 1997), in addressing
∗This work was partially supported by the Austrian Sci-
ence Fund Project N Z29-INF.
preferences in default logic. Previous work in dealing
with preferences has for the most part treated prefer-
ence information at the meta-level (see next to the last
section for a discussion of previous approaches). In con-
trast, we remain within the framework of extended logic
programs: We begin with an ordered logic program,
which is an extended logic program in which rules are
named by unique terms and in which preferences among
rules are given by a new set of atoms of the form s ≺ t,
where s and t are names. Thus, preferences among rules
are encoded at the object-level. An ordered logic pro-
gram is transformed into a second, regular, extended
logic program wherein the preferences are respected, in
the sense that the answer sets obtained in the trans-
formed theory correspond to the preferred answer sets
of the original theory. The approach is sufficiently gen-
eral to allow the specification of preferences among pref-
erences, preferences holding in a particular context, and
preferences holding by default.
Our approach can be seen as a general methodol-
ogy for uniformly incorporating preference information
within a logic program. This transformational approach
has several advantages. First, it is flexible. So one can
encode how a preference order interacts with other in-
formation, or how different types of preference orders
(such as specificity, authority, recency, etc.) are to
be integrated. Second, it is easier to compare differ-
ing approaches handling such orderings, since they can
be represented uniformly in the same general setting.
Thus, for instance, if someone doesn’t like the notion of
preference developed here, they may encode their own
within this framework. Lastly, it is straightforward im-
plementing our approach: In the present case, we have
developed a translator for ordered logic programs that
serves as a front-end for the logic programming systems
dlv (Eiter et al. 1997) and smodels (Niemela¨ & Simons
1997).
The next section gives background terminology and
notation. Afterwards, our central approach is de-
scribed, followed by an exploration of its formal proper-
ties. We then continue with an overview of further fea-
tures and extensions, and provide a pointer to the im-
plementation. Finally, a comparison with related work
is given, and we conclude with a short discussion.
Definitions and Notation
We deal with extended logic programs, which allow for
expressing both classical negation1 as well as negation
as failure (Lifschitz 1996). We use “¬” for classical
negation and “not” for negation as failure. Classical
negation is also referred to as strong negation, whilst
negation as failure is termed weak negation.
Our formal treatment is based on propositional lan-
guages. As usual, a literal, L, is an expression of the
form A or ¬A, where A is an atom. We assume a pos-
sibly infinite set of such atoms. The set of all literals is
denoted by Lit. A literal preceded by the negation as
failure sign not is said to be a weakly negated literal. A
rule, r, is an ordered pair of the form
L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln, (1)
where n ≥ m ≥ 0, and each Li (0 ≤ i ≤ n) is a lit-
eral. The literal L0 is called the head of r, and the
set {L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln} is the body
of r. If n = m, then r is a basic rule; if n = 0,
then r is a fact. An (extended) logic program, or sim-
ply a program, is a finite set of rules. A program is
basic if all rules in it are basic. We use head(r) to
denote the head of rule r, and body(r) to denote the
body of r. Furthermore, let body+(r) = {L1, . . . , Lm}
and body−(r) = {Lm+1, . . . , Ln}. The elements of
body+(r) are referred to as the prerequisites of r. We
say that a rule r is defeated by a set of literals X iff
body−(r)∩X 6= ∅. As well, each literal in body−(r)∩X
is said to defeat r.
A set of literals X is consistent iff it does not contain
a complementary pair A, ¬A of literals. We say that X
is logically closed iff it is either consistent or equals Lit.
Furthermore,X is closed under a basic programΠ iff for
any r ∈ Π, head(r) ∈ X whenever body(r) ⊆ X . The
smallest set of literals which is both logically closed and
closed under a basic program Π is denoted by Cn(Π).
Let Π be a basic program and X a set of literals. The
operator TΠ is defined as follows:
TΠX = {head(r) | r ∈ Π, body(r) ⊆ X}
if X is consistent, and TΠX = Lit otherwise. Iterated
applications of TΠ are written as T
j
Π (j ≥ 0), where
T 0ΠX = X and T
i
ΠX = TΠT
i−1
Π X for i ≥ 1. It is well-
known that Cn(Π) =
⋃
i≥0 T
i
Π∅, for any basic program
Π.
Let r be a rule. Then r+ denotes the basic program
obtained from r by deleting all weakly negated literals
in the body of r, i.e., r+ = head(r) ← body+(r). The
reduct, ΠX , of a program Π relative to a set X of literals
is defined by
ΠX = {r+ | r ∈ Π and r is not defeated by X}.
In other words, ΠX is obtained from Π by (i) delet-
ing any r ∈ Π which is defeated by X and (ii) delet-
ing each weakly negated literal occurring in the bodies
1 Note that classical is a bit of a misnomer since the
operator does not support, for example, contraposition.
of the remaining rules. We say that a set X of liter-
als is an answer set of a program Π iff Cn(ΠX) = X .
Clearly, for each answer set X of a program P , it holds
that X =
⋃
i≥0 T
i
ΠX∅. The answer set semantics for ex-
tended logic programs has been defined in (Gelfond &
Lifschitz 1991) as a generalization of the stable model
semantics (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1988) for general logic
programs (i.e., programs not containing classical nega-
tion, ¬). The reduct ΠX is often called the Gelfond-
Lifschitz reduction.
The set of all generating rules of an answer set X
from Π is defined as follows:
ΓXΠ = {r ∈ Π | r
+ ∈ ΠX and body+(r) ⊆ X}.
That is, each prerequisite of r is in X and r is not
defeated by X . Finally, a sequence 〈ri〉i∈I of rules is
grounded iff, for all i ∈ I, {head(rj) | j < i} is inconsis-
tent, or else body+(ri) ⊆ {head(rj) | j < i}.
Logic Programs with Preferences
A logic program over a propositional language L is said
to be ordered iff L contains the following pairwise dis-
joint categories:
• a set N of terms serving as names for rules;
• a setA of regular (propositional) atoms of a program;
and
• a set A≺ of preference atoms s ≺ t, where s, t ∈ N
are names.
For each ordered program Π, we assume furthermore a
bijective2 function n(·) assigning to each rule r ∈ Π a
name n(r) ∈ N . To simplify our notation, we usually
write nr instead of n(r) (and we sometimes abbreviate
nri by ni). Also, the relation t = n(r) is written as
t : r, leaving the naming function n(·) implicit. The el-
ements of A≺ express preference relations among rules.
Intuitively, nr ≺ nr′ asserts that r′ has “higher” prior-
ity than r. Thus, r′ is viewed as having precedence over
r, i.e., r′ should, in some sense, always be considered
“before” r.
Most importantly, we impose no restrictions on the
occurrences of preference atoms. This allows for ex-
pressing preferences in a very flexible, dynamic way.
For instance, we may specify
nr ≺ nr′ ← p, not q
where p and q may themselves be (or rely on) preference
atoms.
A special case is given by programs containing prefer-
ence atoms only among their facts. We say that a logic
program Π over L is statically ordered if it is of the form
Π = Π′∪Π′′, where Π′ is an ordered logic program over
L\A≺ and Π′′ ⊆ {(nr ≺ nr′)← | r, r′ ∈ Π′}. The static
case can be regarded as being induced from an external
2In practice, function n is only required to be injective
in order to allow for rules not participating in the resultant
preference relation.
a1(r) : head(r) ← ap(nr) c1(r) : ok(nr) ← ok
′(nr, nr1), . . . , ok
′(nr, nrk)
a2(r) : ap(nr) ← ok(nr), body(r) c2(r, r′) : ok
′(nr, nr′) ← not (nr ≺ nr′)
b1(r, L) : bl(nr) ← ok(nr), not L+ c3(r, r′) : ok
′(nr, nr′) ← (nr ≺ nr′), ap(nr′)
b2(r, L) : bl(nr) ← ok(nr), L
− c4(r, r
′) : ok′(nr, nr′) ← (nr ≺ nr′), bl(nr′)
t(r, r′, r′′) : nr ≺ nr′′ ← nr ≺ nr′ , nr′ ≺ nr′′
as(r, r′) : ¬(nr′ ≺ nr) ← nr ≺ nr′
Figure 1: Translated rules τ(r).
order “<”, where the relation r < r′ between two rules
holds iff the fact (nr ≺ nr′)← is included in the ordered
program. We make this explicit by denoting a statically
ordered program Π as a pair (Π′, <), representing the
program Π′ ∪ {(nr ≺ nr′)← | r < r′}. This static con-
cept of preference corresponds in fact to most previous
approaches to preference handling in logic programming
and nonmonotonic reasoning, where the preference in-
formation is specified as a fixed relation at the meta-
level (see, e.g., (Baader & Hollunder 1993; Brewka 1994;
Zhang & Foo 1997; Brewka & Eiter 1999)).
Our approach provides a mapping T that transforms
an ordered logic program Π into a regular logic pro-
gram T (Π), such that the preferred answer sets of Π
are given by the (regular) answer sets of T (Π). Intu-
itively, the translated program T (Π) is constructed in
such a way that the ensuing answer sets respect the in-
herent preference information induced by the given pro-
gram Π (see Theorems 3 and 4 below). This is achieved
by adding sufficient control elements to the rules of Π
which guarantee that successive rule applications are in
accord with the intended order.
Given the relation nr ≺ nr′ , we want to ensure that
r′ is considered before r, in the sense that, for a given
answer set X , rule r′ is known to be applied or defeated
ahead of r with respect to the grounded enumeration
of generating rules of X . We do this by first translat-
ing rules so that the order of rule application can be
explicitly controlled. For this purpose, we need to be
able to detect when a rule has been applied or when
a rule is defeated; as well we need to be able to con-
trol the application of a rule based on other antecedent
conditions. For a rule r, there are two cases for it not
to be applied: it may be that some literal in body+(r)
does not appear in the answer set, or it may be that the
negation of a literal in body−(r) is in the answer set. For
detecting this case, we introduce, for each rule r in the
given program Π, a new, special-purpose atom bl(nr).
Similarly, we introduce a special-purpose atom ap(nr)
to detect the case where a rule has been applied. For
controlling application of rule r we introduce the atom
ok(nr). Informally, we conclude that it is ok to apply a
rule just if it is ok with respect to every ≺-greater rule;
for such a ≺-greater rule r′, this will be the case just
when r′ is known to be blocked or applied.
More formally, given an ordered program Π over L,
let L+ be the language obtained from L by adding,
for each r, r′ ∈ Π, new pairwise distinct propositional
atoms ap(nr), bl(nr), ok(nr), and ok
′(nr, nr′). Then,
our translation T maps an ordered program Π over L
into a regular program T (Π) over L+ in the following
way.
Definition 1 Let Π = {r1, . . . , rk} be an ordered logic
program over L. For each r ∈ Π, let τ(r) be the collec-
tion of rules depicted in Figure 1, where L+ ∈ body+(r),
L− ∈ body−(r), and r′, r′′ ∈ Π. Then, the logic program
T (Π) over L+ is given by
⋃
r∈Π τ(r).
The first four rules of Figure 1 express applicability and
blocking conditions of the original rules: For each rule
r ∈ Π, we obtain two rules, a1(r) and a2(r), along
with n rules of the form b1(r, L), b2(r, L), where n is
the number of literals in the body. The second group
of rules encodes the strategy for handling preferences.
The first of these rules, c1(r), “quantifies” over the
rules in Π. This is necessary when dealing with dy-
namic preferences since preferences may vary depend-
ing on the corresponding answer set. The three rules
c2(r, r
′), c3(r, r
′), and c4(r, r
′) specify the pairwise de-
pendency of rules in view of the given preference order-
ing: For any pair of rules r, r′ with nr ≺ nr′, we derive
ok
′(nr, nr′) whenever nr ≺ nr′ fails to hold, or whenever
either ap(nr′) or bl(nr′) is true. This allows us to de-
rive ok(nr), indicating that r may potentially be applied
whenever we have for all r′ with nr ≺ nr′ that r′ has
been applied or cannot be applied. It is important to
note that this is only one of many strategies for dealing
with preferences: different strategies are obtainable by
changing the specification of ok′(·, ·). Finally, we note
that our implementation represents the second group
of rules in terms of four rule schemas (using variables),
where the first one depends on the number of names
(as opposed to the number of rules; cf. Definition 1).
We have the following characterisation of preferred
answer sets.
Definition 2 Let Π be an ordered logic program over
language L and X a set of literals. We say that X is
a preferred answer set of Π iff X = Y ∩ L for some
answer set Y of T (Π).
In what follows, answer sets of standard (i.e., un-
ordered) logic programs are also referred to as regular
answer sets.
As an illustration of our approach, consider the fol-
lowing program Π:
r1 = ¬a ←
r2 = b ← ¬a, not c
r3 = c ← not b
r4 = n3 ≺ n2 ← not d
where ni denotes the name of rule ri (i = 1, . . . , 4).
This program has two regular answer sets, one con-
taining b and the other containing c; both contain
¬a and n3 ≺ n2. However, only the first is a pre-
ferred answer set. To see this, observe that for any
X ⊆ {head(r) | r ∈ T (Π)}, we have ni ≺ nj 6∈ X for
each (i, j) 6= (3, 2). We thus get for such X and i, j that
ok
′(ni, nj) ∈ T 1T (Π)X∅ by (reduced) rules c2(ri, rj)
+
,
and so ok(ni) ∈ T 2T (Π)X∅ via rule c1(ri)
+ = c1(ri).
Analogously, we get ap(n1), ap(n4),¬a, n3 ≺ n2. Now
consider the following rules from T (Π):
a2(r2) : ap(n2) ← ok(n2),¬a, not c
b1(r2,¬a) : bl(n2) ← ok(n2), not ¬a
b2(r2, c) : bl(n2) ← ok(n2), c
a2(r3) : ap(n3) ← ok(n3), not b
b2(r3, c) : bl(n3) ← ok(n3), b
c3(r3, r2) : ok
′(n3, n2) ← (n3 ≺ n2), ap(n2)
c4(r3, r2) : ok
′(n3, n2) ← (n3 ≺ n2), bl(n2)
Given ok(n2) and ¬a, rule a2(r2) leaves us with the
choice between c 6∈ X or c ∈ X . First, assume c 6∈ X .
We get ap(n2) from a2(r2)
+ ∈ T (Π)X . Hence, we get
b, ok′(n3, n2), and finally ok(n3), which results in bl(n3)
via b2(r3, c). Omitting further details, this yields an an-
swer set containing b while excluding c. Second, assume
c ∈ X . This eliminates a2(r2) when turning T (Π) into
T (Π)X . Also, b1(r2,¬a) is defeated since ¬a is deriv-
able. b2(r2, c) is inapplicable, since c is only derivable
(from ap(n3) via a1(r3)) in the presence of ok(n3). But
ok(n3) is not derivable since neither ap(n2) nor bl(n2) is
derivable. Since this circular situation is unresolvable,
there is no preferred answer set containing c.
Properties of the Approach
Our first result ensures that the dynamically generated
preference information enjoys the usual properties of
strict orderings. To this end, we define the following
relation: for each set X of literals and every r, r′ ∈ Π,
the relation r <X r
′ holds iff nr ≺ nr′ ∈ X .
Theorem 1 Let Π be an ordered logic program and X
a consistent answer set of T (Π). Then <X is a strict
partial order. Moreover, if Π has only static prefer-
ences, then <X=<Y , for any answer set Y of T (Π).
The following results shed light on the functioning
induced by translation T ; they elaborate upon the logic
programming operator TT (Π) :
Theorem 2 Let X be a consistent answer set of T (Π)
for an ordered program Π, and let Ω = T (Π)X . Then,
for any r ∈ Π:
1. ok(nr) ∈ X;
2. ap(nr) ∈ X iff bl(nr) 6∈ X;
3. if r is not defeated by X, ok(nr) ∈ T iΩ∅, and
body+(r) ⊆ T jΩ∅, then ap(nr) ∈ T
max(i,j)+1
Ω ∅;
4. ok(nr) ∈ T iΩ∅ and body
+(r) 6⊆ X implies bl(nr) ∈
T i+1Ω ∅;
5. if r is defeated by X and ok(nr) ∈ T iΩ∅, then bl(nr) ∈
T
j
Ω∅ for some j > i;
6. ok(nr) 6∈ T iΩ∅ implies ap(nr) 6∈ T
j
Ω∅ and bl(nr) 6∈ T
k
Ω∅
for all j, k < i+ 2.
The next result shows that the translated rules are
considered in accord to the partial order induced by the
given preference relation:
Theorem 3 Let Π be an ordered logic program, X a
consistent answer set of T (Π), and 〈ri〉i∈I a grounded
enumeration of the set ΓX
T (Π) of generating rules of X
from T (Π). Then, for all r, r′ ∈ Π:
If r <X r
′, then j < i,
for all ri equaling ak(r) or bk(r, L), and some rj equal-
ing ak′(r
′) or bk′(r
′, L′), with k, k′ = 1, 2, L ∈ body(r),
and L′ ∈ body(r′).
For static preferences, our translation T amounts to
selecting the answer sets of the underlying unordered
program that comply with the ordering, <.
Definition 3 Let (Π, <) be a statically ordered pro-
gram. An answer set X of Π is called <-preserving if
X is either inconsistent, or else there exists a grounded
enumeration 〈ri〉i∈I of ΓXΠ such that, for every i, j ∈ I,
we have that:
1. if ri < rj, then j < i; and
2. if ri < r
′ and r′ ∈ Π \ ΓXΠ , then body
+(r′) 6⊆ X or r′
is defeated by the set {head(rj) | j < i}.
The next result furnishes semantical underpinnings for
statically ordered programs; it provides a correspon-
dence between preferred answer sets and regular answer
sets of the original program:
Theorem 4 Let (Π, <) be a statically ordered logic
program and X a set of literals. Then, X is a preferred
answer set of (Π, <) iff X is a <-preserving answer set
of Π.
This gives rise to the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Let (Π, <) and X be as in Theorem 4. If
X is a preferred answer set of (Π, <), then X is an
answer set of Π.
Note that the last two results have no counterparts in
the general (dynamic) case, due to the lack of a regu-
lar answer set of the original program. The preference
information is only fully available in the answer sets
of the translated program (hence the restriction of the
notion of <-preservation to the static case).
Also, if no preference information is present, our ap-
proach is equivalent to standard answer set semantics.
Moreover, the notions of statically ordered and (dynam-
ically) ordered programs coincide in this case.
Theorem 5 Let Π be a logic program over L and X a
set of literals. If Π contains no preference information,
i.e. if L ∩ A≺ = ∅, then the following statements are
equivalent:
1. X is a preferred answer set of statically ordered logic
program (Π, ∅);
2. X is a preferred answer set of ordered logic program
Π;
3. X is a regular answer set of logic program Π.
Recently, Brewka and Eiter (Brewka & Eiter 1999)
suggested two principles, simply termed Principle I and
Principle II , which, they argue, any defeasible rule sys-
tem handling preferences should satisfy. The next result
shows that our approach obeys these principles. How-
ever, since the original formulation of Principle I and
II is rather generic—motivated by the aim to cover as
many different approaches as possible—we must instan-
tiate them in terms of our formalism. It turns out that
Principle I is only suitable for statically ordered pro-
grams, whilst Principle II admits two guises, one for
statically ordered programs, and another one for (dy-
namically) ordered programs.
Principles I and II, formulated for our approach, are
as follows:
Principle I. Let (Π, <) be a statically ordered logic
program, and let X1 and X2 be two (regular) answer
sets of Π generated by R∪{r1} and R∪{r2}, respec-
tively, where r1, r2 6∈ R. If r1 < r2, then X1 is not a
preferred answer set of (Π, <).
Principle II-S (Static Case). Let X be a preferred
answer set of statically ordered logic program (Π, <),
let r be a rule wherein body+(r) 6⊆ X , and let <′
be a strict partial order which agrees with < on rules
from Π. Then, X∪A is an answer set of (Π∪{r}, <′),
where
A = {nr ≺ ns | r <
′ s} ∪ {¬(ns ≺ nr) | r <
′ s}.3
Principle II-D (Dynamic Case). Let X be a pre-
ferred answer set of a (dynamically) ordered logic
program Π, and let r be a rule such that body+(r) 6⊆
X . Then, X is an answer set of Π ∪ {r}.
Theorem 6 Statically ordered logic programs obey
Principles I and II-S. Furthermore, ordered logic pro-
grams enjoy Principle II-D.
Observe that, since transformation T is clearly poly-
nomial in the size of ordered logic programs, and be-
cause of Theorem 5, the complexity of our approach is
inherited from the complexity of standard answer set
semantics in a straightforward way. We just note the
following result:
3The inclusion of A is necessary because we encode the
preference information at the object level.
Theorem 7 Given an ordered program Π, checking
whether Π has a preferred answer set is NP-complete.
Further Issues and Refinements
In this section, we sketch the range of applicability and
point out distinguishing features of our approach. We
briefly mention two points concerning expressiveness,
and then sketch how we can deal with preferences over
sets of rules. Lastly, we refer to the implementation of
our approach.
First, we draw the reader’s attention to the expres-
sive power offered by dynamic preferences in connection
with variables in the input language, such as
n1(x) ≺ n2(y)← p(y), not (x = c), (2)
where n1(x), n2(y) are names of rules containing the
variables x and y, respectively. Although such a rule
represents only its set of ground instances, it is actually
a much more concise specification. Also, since most
other approaches employ static preferences of the form
n1(x) ≺ n2(y) ←, such approaches would necessarily
have to express (2) as an enumeration of static ground
preferences rather than a single rule.
Second, we note that transformation T is also appli-
cable to disjunctive logic programs (where rule heads
are disjunctions of literals). To see this, observe that
the transformed rules unfold the conditions expressed
in the body of the rules, while the rules’ head remain
untouched, as manifested by rule a1(r).
Third, we have extended the approach to allow for
preferences between sets of rules. Although we do not
include a full discussion here, we remark that this ex-
tension has also been implemented (see below). In or-
der to refer to sets of rules, the language is adjoined
by a set M of terms serving as names for sets of rules,
and, in addition, the set A≺ may now include atoms
of the form m ≺ m′ with m,m′ ∈ M. Accordingly,
set-ordered programs contain preference information be-
tween names of sets. Informally, setM of rules is appli-
cable iff all its members are applicable. Consequently,
ifM ′ is preferred overM , thenM is considered after all
rules in M ′ are found to be applicable, or some rule in
M ′ is found to be inapplicable. As before, set-ordered
programs are translated into standard logic programs,
where suitable control elements ok(·), bl(·), and ap(·),
ranging over names of sets, take care of the intended
ordering information.
As an example, consider where in buying a car one
ranks the price (e) over safety features (s) over power
(p), but safety features together with power is ranked
over price. Taking rx = x ← not ¬x for x ∈ {e, s, p},
we can write this (informally) as:
m1 : {rp} < m2 : {rs} < m3 : {re} < m4 : {rp, rs}
The terms m1, m2, m3, and m4 are names of sets of
rules. If we were given only that not all desiderata
can be satisfied (i.e. ← p, e, s) then we could apply
the rules in the set (named) m4 and conclude that p
and s can be met. Furthermore, sets of rules are de-
scribed extensionally by means of atoms in(·, ·). Thus,
the set m4 : {rp, rs} is captured by in(np,m4) ← and
in(ns,m4) ←. Accordingly, we have in(np,m1) ←,
in(ns,m2) ←, and in(ne,m3) ←. Given rules re, rp, rs
and the previous facts about in, the specification of our
example is completed by the preferences mi ≺ mi+1 ←
for i = 1, 2, 3.
Lastly, the approach has been implemented in Pro-
log and serves as a front-end to the logic programming
systems dlv and smodels. The current prototype is
available at
http://www.cs.uni-potsdam.de/~torsten/plp/.
This URL contains also diverse examples taken from the
literature. Both the dynamic approach to (single) pref-
erences and the set-based approach have been imple-
mented. We note also that the implementation differs
from the approach described here in two respects: first,
the translation applies to named rules only, i.e., it leaves
unnamed rules unaffected; and second, it provides a
module which admits the specification of rules contain-
ing variables, whereby rules of this form are processed
by applying an additional grounding step. A more de-
tailed account regarding the implemented front-end can
be found in (Delgrande, Schaub, & Tompits 2000).
Comparison with Related Work
Dealing with preferences on rules seems to necessitate
a two-level approach. This in fact is a characteristic of
many approaches found in the literature. The majority
of these approaches treat preference at the meta-level
by defining alternative semantics. (Brewka 1996) pro-
poses a modification of well-founded semantics in which
dynamic preferences may be given for rules employing
not. (Zhang & Foo 1997) and (Brewka & Eiter 1999)
propose different prioritized versions of answer set se-
mantics. In (Zhang & Foo 1997) static preferences are
addressed first, by defining the reduct of a logic program
Π, which is a subset of Π that is most preferred. For
the following example, their approach gives two answer
sets (one with p and one with ¬p) which seems to be
counter-intuitive; ours in contrast has a single answer
set containing ¬p.
r1 : p← not q1
r2 : ¬p← not q2
r1 < r2
Moreover, the dynamic case is addressed by specifying
a transformation of a dynamic program to a set of static
programs.
Brewka and Eiter (Brewka & Eiter 1999) address
static preferences on rules in extended logic programs.
They begin with a strict partial order on a set of rules,
but define preference with respect to total orders that
conform to the original partial order. Preferred answer
sets are then selected from among the collection of an-
swer sets of the (unprioritised) program. In contrast,
we deal only with the original partial order, which is
translated into the object theory. As well, only pre-
ferred extensions are produced in our approach; there
is no need for meta-level filtering of extensions.
A two-level approach is also found in (Gelfond &
Son 1997), where a methodology for directly encod-
ing preferences in logic programs is proposed. The
“second-order flavour” of this approach stems from
the reification of rules and preferences. For example,
a rule p ← r,¬s, not q is expressed by the formula
default(n, p, [r,¬s], [q]) where n is the name of the rule.
The Prolog-like list notation [r,¬s] and [q] raises the
possibility of an infinite Herbrand universe; this is prob-
lematic for systems like smodels and dlv that rely on
finite Herbrand universes.
Conclusion
We have described an approach for compiling prefer-
ences into logic programs under the answer set seman-
tics. An ordered logic program, in which preferences
appear in the program rules, is transformed into a sec-
ond, extended logic program wherein the preferences
are respected, in that the answer sets obtained in the
transformed theory correspond with the preferred an-
swer sets of the original theory. In a certain sense, our
transformation can be regarded as an axiomatisation of
(our interpretation of) preference. Arguably then, we
describe a general methodology for uniformly incorpo-
rating preference information in a logic program. In this
approach, we avoid the two-level structure of previous
work. While the previous “meta-level” approaches must
commit themselves to a semantics and a fixed strategy,
our approach (as well as that of (Gelfond & Son 1997))
is very flexible with respect to changing strategies, and
is open for adaptation to different semantics and differ-
ent concepts of preference handling.
The approach is easily restricted to reflect a static
ordering in which preferences are external to a logic
program. We also indicated how the approach can be
extended to deal with preferences among sets of rules.
Finally, this paper demonstrates that our approach is
easily implementable; indeed, we have developed a com-
piler, as a front-end for dlv and smodels.
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